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ROE v. WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS
BOARD: SOMETHING FISHY IN CALIFORNIA
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
One of the most controversial and least understood aspects of Cali-

fornia workers' compensation law' is the extent to which an employer
who is concurrently negligent can use damages recovered from a third

party tortfeasor to offset his workers' compensation liability to an injured employee. The California Supreme Court, in the landmark decision of Roe v. WCAB, 2 held that a finding of concurrent employer negligence will act as a complete bar to any such offset attempt by an employer, even if as a result, the injured employee receives a double recovery.
This note will analyze the decision in Roe, and its effect on the

law of workers' compensation in California. In addition, an alternative
solution will be posited which attempts to provide a more equitable resolution of this problem.
Initially, however, a detailed examination of the applicable statu-

tory provisions and the relevant prior case law is essential to an understanding of the Roe decision.

Statutory Structure
An employee injured during the course of his employment can recover workers' compensation benefits from his employer.3 These ben1. In 1974, the California legislature passed a statute in which it expressed its
intent to change the term "workmen's compensation" to "workers' compensation." See
CAL. LABOR CODE § 3200 (West Supp. 1975).
2. 12 Cal. 3d 884, 528 P.2d 771, 117 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1974). The companion
case to Roe is Gregory v. WCAB, 12 Cal. 3d 899, 528 P.2d 782, 117 Cal. Rptr. 694
(1974).
3. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600 (West 1971). The definition of an "employer" in
California includes the employer's workers' compensation insurer. CAL. LABOR CODE §
3850(b) (West 1971). Thus, the compensation carrier has the same right of action as
the insured employer, as it is subrogated to the employer's rights. Hereinafter, the term
"employer" will be used to mean either the actual employer or his compensation insurer.
In California there are two types of workers' compensation benefits-temporary and
permanent. Temporary benefits are awarded by the employer immediately after the injury. Subsequently, an employee may appear before the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) and request a permanent disability award. Both temporary and
permanent workers' compensation benefits are normally paid weekly.
[637]
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efits are his exclusive remedy against his employer, 4 and they are determined without regard to the fault of any of the parties involved.'
The receipt of workers' compensation benefits, however, does not preclude an injured employee from also bringing a common law action for
damages against a third party tortfeasor who proximately caused his injuries. 6
In order to avoid double recovery by the employee and to place
the financial burden upon the negligent third party who caused the employee's injury, the California Labor Code provides the employer with
7
subrogation rights.
The subrogation statutes offer the employer two types of relief:
reimbursement and credit.8 The reimbursement sections allow the
employer to recover from the third party tortfeasor the benefits which
the employer has paid to the employee up until the time of the third
party suit.' The credit provisions permit the employer to offset the
employee's third party recovery against his obligation to pay to the employee any future (i.e., post-trial) workers' compensation benefits. 10
4. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1975).
5. CAL. CONST. art. XX,§ 21.
6. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 3852 (West 1971). Section 3852 provides: "The
claim of an employee for compensation does not affect his claim or right of action for
all damages proximately resulting from such injury or death against any person other
than the employer. Any employer who pays, or becomes obligated to pay compensation,
or who pays, or becomes obligated to pay salary in lieu of compensation, may likewise
make a claim or bring an action against such third person. In the latter event the employer may recover in the same suit, in addition to the total amount of compensation,
damages for which he was liable including all salary, wage, pension, or other emolument
paid to the employee or to his dependents." Id.
The employee can choose the order in which he wants to pursue these two remedies.
He can sue the third party before or after seeking his permanent disability award. In
view of the current state of the law in California, the choice which the employee makes
in this regard affects the amount he will recover. See notes 214-215 and accompanying
text infra.
7. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3850-64 (West 1971 & Supp. 1975). One court succinctly stated the purpose of the subrogation provisions: "When compensable injury is
the result of a third party's tortious conduct our statutes preserve a right of action
against the tort feasor. The compensation system was not designed to extend immunity
to strangers. To avoid a double recovery by the employee our statutes provide a system
with the general effect of reimbursing the employer, or his substituted insurance carrier,
for compensation outlay and of giving the employee the excess of the damage recovery
over the amount of compensation." Sanstad v. IAC, 171 Cal. App. 2d 32, 35, 339 P.2d
943, 944 (1959).
8. Nelsen v. WCAB, 11 Cal. App. 3d 472, 478-79, 89 Cal. Rptr. 638, 639-42
(1970).
9. CAL.LABOR CODE §§ 3852, 3853, 3856(b) (West 1971).
10. The California statute provides: "After payment of litigation expenses and attorneys' fees fixed by the court pursuant to Section 3856 and payment of the employer's
lien, the employer shall be relieved from the obligation to pay further compensation to
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This distinction between the employer's reimbursement rights and his
credit rights is fundamental to an understanding of this complex area.
In pursuing his reimbursement rights against the negligent third
party, the employer has three options.': He may: (1) bring an action
directly against the third party, 12 (2) join as a party plaintiff or inter-

vene in an action brought by the employee,' 8 or (3) allow the employee to bring the action -himself and subsequently apply for a first
lien against the amount of the employee's judgment, less an allowance
for litigation expenses and attorneys' fees.' 4 On the other hand, the

employer's credit rights' 5 are awarded by the Workers' Compensation

Appeals Board (WCAB or the board), which has exclusive jurisdiction
in this regard.' 0
The wording of these reimbursement and credit statutes does not

distinguish the rights of negligent employers from those of non-negligent employers.' 7 It is well settled that a non-negligent employer can
use both the reimbursement and the credit provisions to recoup his
workers' compensation liability.'$ The rights of a concurrently negligent employer, however, have not been so clearly defined. This note
will address the problem of the extent to which the reimbursement and

credit provisions should be available to the concurrently negligent employer.
A Partial Answer-Witt v. Jackson
Before 1961, a finding of employer negligence had no effect on
or on behalf of the employee under this division up to the entire amount of the balance
of the judgment, if satisfied, without any deduction. No satisfaction of such judgment
in whole or in part, shall be valid without giving the employer notice and a reasonable
opportunity to perfect and satisfy his lien." CAL. LABOR CODE § 3858 (West 1971).
In addition the statute provides: "The appeals board is empowered to and shall allow,
as a credit to the employer to be applied against his liability for compensation, such
amount of any recovery by the employee for his injury, either by settlement or after
judgment, as has not theretofore been applied to the payment of expenses or attorneys'
fees, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 3856, 3858, and 3860 of this code, or has
not been applied to reimburse the employer." Id. § 3861.
11. Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 69, 366 P.2d 641, 648, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 376
(1961).
12. CAL. LABoR CODE § 3852 (West 1971).
13. Id. § 3853.
14. Id. § 3856(b).
15. Id. §§ 3858, 3861.
16. Slayton v. Wright, 271 Cal. App. 2d 219, 232, 76 Cal. Rptr. 494, 502 (1969).
17. See notes 11-15 & accompanying text supra.
18. See, e.g., Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 71-73, 366 P.2d 641, 649-50, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 369, 377-78 (1961); Nelsen v. WCAB, 11 Cal. App. 3d 472, 476, 89 Cal. Rptr.
638, 639 (1970).
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the employer's reimbursement and credit rights. 19 In Witt v. Jackson,"0 however, Justice Traynor, speaking for the California Supreme
Court, held that a finding of employer negligence would bar an employer's assertion of his reimbursement rights. 2 1 In order to avoid double
recovery by the injured employee, the court determined, the third party
would be allowed to deduct the reimbursement amount from -his judg2
ment. 1
The decision in Witt strongly influenced the court in Roe v.
WCAB. 2 ' Therefore, a careful examination of the theory and actual
holding of Witt is fundamental to an evaluation of the Roe decision.
The Theory Underlying Witt
At common law there were no contribution rights among joint
tortfeasors.2 4 In 1957, however, the California legislature abrogated
this rule and provided for such contribution. 5 The court in Witt was
thus faced with two conflicting theories. On one hand, under workers'
compensation law, the employer was exclusively liable to the employee
but could, by statute, seek reimbursement from the third party tortfeasor for the amount paid to the injured employee in benefits up to
the time of trial.2 6 Presumably, this right attached regardless of the
employer's concurrent negligence. On the other hand, by enactment
of the contribution sections, the legislature clearly evidenced the intent
that joint wrongdoers should share equally in bearing the cost for the
injury which they caused.
The Holding of Witt
Attempting to reconcile these conflicting statutory schemes, the
court held that the old rule which allowed a negligent employer the
right of reimbursement 27 had been rendered obsolete by the enactment
19.

See, e.g., Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 434-35, 218 P.2d 17,

33 (1950).
20. 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961).
21. Id. at 73, 366 P.2d at 650, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
22. Id. The term "reimbursement amount" signifies the dollar amount of the
workers' compensation benefits paid to the employee by the employer up to the time

of the trial.
23. 12 Cal. 3d 884, 528 P.2d 771, 117 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1974) (passim).
24. See, e.g., Pacific Indem. Co. v. California Elec. Works, 29 Cal. App. 2d 260,
265, 84 P.2d 313, 316 (1938).

25. Cal. Sta. 1957, ch. 1700, § 1, at 3077 (codified at CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. §§
875-80 (West Supp. 1975)). The pro rata share, or "contribution," of each tortfeasor
judgment debtor shall be determined by dividing the entire judgment equally among all
of them.

Id. § 876(a).

26.
27.
(1950).

See notes 8-14 & accompanying text supra.
See Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 434-35, 218 P.2d 17, 33
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of the contribution statutes. 28 Moreover, the court found that since the
reimbursement sections2 9 do not address the issue of employer negligence, they must be construed to be qualified by the statement in California Civil Code section 3517 that "no one can take advantage of his
own wrong."t ° Justice Traynor concluded, therefore, that an employer's concurrent negligence precludes him from using the reimbursement benefits paid prior to the time of trial.," In order that this holding would not result in double recovery by the employee, Justice Traynor also concluded that the third party could deduct from the judgment
against him the amount of workers' compensation benefits which the
employee had received. 2
28. 57 Cal. 2d at 70, 366 P.2d at 648, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
29. See notes 8-14 & accompanying text supra.
30. 57 Cal. 2d at 72, 366 P.2d at 649, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 377, citing CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3517 (West 1970).
31. With the court's holding that the employer's concurrent negligence bars his reimbursement rights, California departed from the view shared by almost all other states
that have considered the question. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Cuban Am. Nickel
Co., 396 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1968) (Louisiana); Sargent v. Axel H. Ohman, Inc., 343
F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1972); Marciniak v. Pennsylvania R.R., 152 F. Supp. 89 (D.
Del. 1957); Perruccio v. Nadeau, 30 Conn. Supp. 126, 304 A.2d 225 (Super. Ct., 1973);
Pyles v. Bridges, 283 So. 2d 394 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Galvan v. John
Caretti Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 894, 287 N.E.2d 90 (1972); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Cedar
Valley Elec. Co., 187 Iowa 1014, 174 N.W. 709 (1919); General Box Co. v. Missouri
Util. Co., 331 Mo. 845, 55 S.W.2d 442 (1932); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Mueller, 273 Wis. 616, 79 N.W.2d 246 (1956).
32. 57 Cal. 2d at 73, 366 P.2d at 650, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 378. Several commentators
have discussed Witt v. Jackson. E.g., Riesenfeld, Workmen's Compensation and Other
Social Legislation: The Shadow of Stone Tablets, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 207, 216-18
(1965); Note, Workmen's Compensation: Employer's Rights Against Third Party Tortfeasors, 50 CALiF. L. Rav. 571 (1962); Note, Workmen's Compensationand Third Party
Suits: The Aftermath of Witt v. Jackson, 21 HASTINGs LJ. 661 (1970); Note, Workmen's Compensation: The Impact of the Witt v. Jackson Rule on the Law of Third
Party Settlements, 17 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 651 (1970). One commentator, then WCAB
referee Ralph L. Lupton, strongly criticizes the Witt opinion in an excellent article.
Lupton, Witt vs. Jackson-Interpretation,41 CAL. ST. B.J. 690 (1966). Lupton argues
that before the decision in Witt, the California position was clear-the concurrent negligence of the employer would not bar his assertion of his reimbursement rights. Id. at
690-91, citing Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 218 P.2d 17 (1950). Although Justice Traynor maintained in Witt that the enactment of sections 875-80 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, allowing contribution among joint tortfeasors, rendered the rationale of these past cases "obsolete," Lupton disagrees. See id. at 691-94. Instead, he
persuasively argues that these sections have no application to the workers' compensation
area, since the employer is, by statute, expressly not liable in tort to the employee. Id.
Moreover, Lupton adds, the North Carolina cases upon which the court in Witt so
strongly relied, expressly stated that only "independent negligence" on the part of the
employer would bar his reimbursement rights. Id. at 697-99. Lupton points out that
independent negligence had been defined by the North Carolina court as "negligence of
the employer other than that imputable to him under the doctrine of respondeat superior." Id. at 697-98, quoting Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 669, 73 S.E.2d 886,

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 27

The Witt case thus established two basic principles. First, in the
case of a negligent third party and a concurrently negligent employer,
neither party should bear the entire cost for the employee's injury. A
proper loss allocation must be made between them, and within the restrictive framework of the workers' compensation system, this allocation
is best accomplished by denying the employer his right to reimbursement. Second, the employee should not be allowed a double recovery.
The Issue Not Resolved by Witt
The opinion in Witt dealt with the reimbursement sections of the
Labor Code. It left unanswered, however, the question of whether a
finding of concurrent employer negligence would bar the employer's
use of the credit provisions as well. It is primarily this question which
the supreme court faced in Roe. 3
Roe, an employee, suffered severe industrial injuries in an accident caused by a third party's negligence. He received temporary
workers' compensation disability benefits and also filed a damage action against the third party. The employer elected not to join the lawsuit,3 4 and Roe and the third party settled the suit without reference
to the employer's status.3 5 Roe then applied to the WCAB for a perThe employer asserted his right to credit
manent disability award.3
pro tanto Roe's net settlement against his own liability for permanent
disability benefits.3 7 Roe sought to raise the employer's concurrent
negligence as a bar to his assertion of credit; however, the referee refused to inquire into the employer's concurrent negligence, awarded
Roe a permanent disability rating of 96 percent, and ordered that the
employer be allowed his credit rights.3 8 The board refused reconsideration, but the court of appeal reversed and9 annulled the award. The
supreme court thereafter granted a hearingY
892 (1953). Lupton concludes that in Witt, the negligence of the employer was based
solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at 699. Hence Lovette, although relied upon by the court in Witt, was clearly inapplicable to the factual situation in Witt.

Id.
Despite these criticisms, however, Witt has been followed consistently, albeit sometimes incorrectly, by the California courts. Witt's longevity, no doubt, is due to the

seemingly equitable solution formulated by Justice Traynor to the problem of concurrent
employer
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
this right
38.
39.

negligence in the reimbursement situation.
12 Cal. 3d 884, 528 P.2d 771, 117 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1974).
Id. at 886, 528 P.2d at 773, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
Id.
Id. at 886-87, 528 P.2d at 773, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
Id. at 887, 528 P.2d at 773, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 685. For an explanation of
to credit, see notes 15-16 & accompanying text supra.
12 Cal. 3d at 887, 528 P.2d at 773, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
1d. Briefly, the structure for processing a workers' compensation claim is as

follows.

The WCAB is composed of seven commissioners, five of whom must be "ex-
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The facts in Roe illustrate the typical three-cornered problem involved in a resolution of the credit issue. Three parties, the employer,
the third party tortfeasor, and the employee, seek to claim the amount

of money which the employer is to pay in future workers' compensation benefits. The employer asserts his right to a credit for this amount
under Labor Code sections 3861 and 3858.40

The third party would

like to extend the logic of Witt, and upon a showing of concurrent employer negligence, have the credit amount deducted from the damages

he must pay the employee. Finally, the employee, by raising his employer's concurrent negligence as a bar to his assertion of credit before
the WCAB, seeks a double recovery consisting of both future workers'
compensation benefits and damages from the third party. Prior to Roe,
there were three lines of cases which attempted to resolve this triangu-

lar battle.
The Third Party Tortfeasor's Claim
Although Witt did not resolve the issue of a third party tortfeasor's
right to deduct future workers' compensation benefits to be paid the
employee, a series of four court of appeal decisions 4 ' later addressed
this specific issue, each successive case building on the previous one.
In each case, the third party raised the employer's concurrent negli-

gence, either as an affirmative defense or by cross-complaint.42

perienced" attorneys admitted to practice in California. CAL. LABOR CODE § 112 (West
1971). The referees of the board, whose title has recently been changed to "judges,"
preside over workers' compensation proceedings. In any case regularly assigned to a
trial referee, the decision of the referee is the decision of the board unless reconsideration is granted. WCAB R. 10345. Any aggrieved party, within 20 days after the referee's decision, may petition the board for reconsideration. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 590003 (West 1971). The grounds for reconsideration are fully set out in the Labor Code.
See CAL. LABOR CODE § 5903 (West 1971). Before a party may apply to a court of
appeal or the California Supreme Court by writ of review, he must, as a condition precedent, petition for reconsideration. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 5901, 5950 (West 1971). The
grounds for issuance of a writ of review by an appellate court are set out in the Labor
Code. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 5952 (West 1971). Further appeal is provided by motion for rehearing in the court of appeal and by petition for hearing to the California
Supreme Court. Sup. Or. & Crs. OF App. R. 27. For an excellent detailed discussion
of the procedure involved in workers' compensation claims, see S. HEPLiCK, CALiFORNA
WoRxmN's COmrENsATioN LA W HANBOOK 433-599 (1970 & Supp. 1975).

40. See note 10 supra.
41. Patterson v. Sharp, 10 Cal. App. 3d 990, 89 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1970); Slayton
v. Wright, 271 Cal. App. 2d 219, 76 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1969); Castro v. Fowler Equip.
Co., 233 Cal. App. 2d 416, 43 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1965); Conner v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 263, 41 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1964).
42. Patterson v. Sharp, 10 Cal. App. 3d 990, 993, 89 Cal. Rptr. 396, 398 (1970)
(raised by affirmative defense); Slayton v. Wright, 271 Cal. App. 2d 219, 224, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 494, 497 (1969) (raised by affirmative defense); Castro v. Fowler Equip. Co., 233
Cal. App. 2d 416, 418, 43 Cal. Rptr. 589, 591 (1965) (raised by cross-complaint); Con-
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In Conner v. Utah Construction and Mining Co.,4" the employee
sued the third party tortfeasor before receiving a permanent workers'
compensation award. The third party requested a jury instruction that
the amount of temporary workers' compensation benefits already paid
and the amount of permanent workers' compensation benefits to be
paid to the employee be deducted from any judgment against the third
party. 44 The appellate court upheld the trial court's rejection of this
instruction, labeling the third party claim an "unusual and impractical
extension of Witt v. Jackson.' 45
In Castro v. Fowler Equipment Co., 4 6 the facts were similar to
those in Conner, but in addition, the third party proffered testimony
concerning the monetary value of future benefits which the employee
7
would be entitled to receive under the workers' compensation act.1
The appellate court again rejected the third party's claim of deduction
for these future benefits, stating: "No rating having been made by the
Industrial Accident Commission (now WCAB), it is impossible for any
court to determine what that rating might be. The Commission has
exclusive jurisdiction to determine compensation . . . .- The court
added: "Even [if] a rating had been made by the Industrial Accident
Commission, it does not necessarily follow that the respondent would
receive all that such award would allow as it may be terminated by
death or other events . . . . 4 Thus in Castro, the court's rejection
of the third party's claim appears to have been predicated on the speculative nature of proof of permanent benefits to be paid.
By contrast, in Slayton v. Wright, 50 the issue of speculation was
presented very nicely, as one of the two injured employee-plaintiffs had
received a permanent disability award prior to trial, while the other had
not." Nevertheless, the court rejected the third party's attempt to rener v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 263, 268-69, 41 Cal. Rptr. 728,
731-32 (1964) (raised by cross-complaint). It is well settled that a third party tortfeasor can raise the employer's concurrent negligence as an affirmative defense, even if
the employer is not a party to the action. Moreover, under certain circumstances, he
can bring the employer into the suit by cross-complaint. For a full discussion of this
issue, see notes 197-206 infra.
43. 231 Cal. App. 2d 263, 41 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1964).
44. Id. at 275, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
45. Id.
46. 233 Cal. App. 2d 416, 43 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1965).
47. Id. at 419, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
48. Id. at 421, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
49. Id.
50. 271 Cal. App. 2d 219, 76 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1969).
51. Id. at 231, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 501. The fact that the permanent disability award
was made before trial does not eliminate speculation as to the ultimate amount that the
employee will receive in benefits. See note 49 & accompanying text supra. The court
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duce the judgment against him by the amount of future permanent disability payments already determined and awarded to the one employee,
stating:
It would be incongruous to disallow the deduction in Nina
Lackey's case and to allow the deduction from Mamie J. Slayton's
judgment merely because the former had not received her rating
while the latter had been rated. Under such a rationale, the deductions of future benefits would depend upon a purely adventitious occurrence-the time an award issued. Such a 52result would
be unconscionable and strictly dependent upon chance.
Thus, the court in Slayton did not consider the absence of speculation to be the dispositive factor. Even though the amount of workers'
compensation benefits was already determined as to one employee, the
third party was not allowed to extend his "Witt reduction" to include
this sum. The court's rationale in Slayton is evident. The third party's
rights should not be determined by whether the employee elects to seek
his permanent award before trial (thus allowing the third party an extended Witt reduction), or after trial (thereby precluding the increased
deduction).
In the final appellate decision on this issue, Patterson v. Sharp,"
the third party tried a different tack. Instead of asking the trial court
for a reduction of the judgment against him by the amount of future
workers' compensation benefits, he succeeded in obtaining an order
that each future workers' compensation benefit payment from the employer would be sent to the third party rather than to the employee.5 4
This diversion of payments to the third party in the future (as opposed
to a reduction of the money judgment against him by their prospective
dollar amount) minimized the concern expressed in Castro that the
third party would enjoy a windfall if the employee were to die before
the workers' compensation benefits had been paid in full. 55 Moreover, the court of appeal acknowledged that limiting the third party's
Witt reduction to those benefits received until the time of trial would
in Slayton, however, did not decide the case on the basis of this uncertainty. See note
52 & accompanying text infra.
52. 271 Cal. App. 2d at 233, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
53. 10 Cal. App. 3d 990, 89 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1970).
54. Id. at 995, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 399. The amount of future workers' compensation
benefits bad already been determined by the time of trial. Id. at 993, 89 Cal. Rptr.
at 401.
55. Id. at 997-98, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 401. See note 49 & accompanying text supra.
To expand, the third party had already been allowed to deduct from the judgment against
him the full amount of future workers' compensation benefits, on the theory that the
employee would receive all these benefits later and should not be allowed double recovery. If, however, the employee were to die before the benefits had been fully paid, the
third party would already have deducted from the judgment against him an amount
which the employee would never receive.
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arbitrarily determine the extent of his rights according to the amount
of time which had transpired between the employee's injury and the
time of trial:
[T]he ruling denying a reduction of the third party judgment in the
full amount of benefits to be paid in the future means that the effect of the Witt rule itself, in any proper case, will be subject to
gross variations by reason of time factors ....
The effect of a substantive rule should not be subject to the
vagaries of calendaring. 6
The court of appeal, although recognizing merit in the trial court's
action, nevertheless felt constrained by the language of Labor Code
section 595557 to hold that the trial court had no jurisdiction to divert
these workers' compensation payments from the employee to the third
party.5" The court therefore failed to adopt this ingenious approach.
Conner, Castro, Slayton, and Patterson each rejected the third
party tortfeasor's claim to a reduction of the employee's judgment
against him by the amount of future permanent disability payments.
One-third of the triangular battle had therefore been settled by the
courts.
The Employer and the Employee Claims
Prior to Roe, in the leading cases of Nelsen v. WCAB 59 and Corley v. WCAB, 60 the courts of appeal of the Third and Fourth Districts,
respectively, took diametrically opposed positions regarding the concurrently negligent employer's right to assert his credit claim under Labor
Code sections 3858 and 3861.61
Nelsen v. WCAB
In Nelsen, an injured employee received temporary workers' compensation benefits and then brought a damage suit against the third
56. Patterson v. Sharp, 10 Cal. App. 3d 990, 997-98, 89 Cal. Rptr. 396, 401
(1970).
57. Section 5955 provides: "No court of this state, except the Supreme Court and
the courts of appeal to the extent herein specified, has jurisdiction to review, reverse,
correct or annul any order, rule, decision or award of the appeals board, or to suspend
or delay the operation or execution thereof, or to restrain, enjoin, or interfere with the
appeals board in the performance of its duties but a writ of mandate shall lie from the
Supreme Court or the courts of appeals in all proper cases." CAL. LABOR CODE § 5955
(West 1971).
58. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 998-99, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 401-02. The court also based
its holding on the fact that Witt applied only to benefits "made" and amounts "received,"
not to benefits "to be made" and amounts "to be received." Id. at 998, 89 Cal. Rptr.
at 397.
59. 11 Cal. App. 3d 472, 89 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1970).
60. 22 Cal. App. 3d 447, 99 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1971).
61. See note 10 supra.
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party. The employer intervened in the action and filed a lien claim.
The court found the employer and third party concurrently negligent
and allowed the third party his Witt reduction. Thereafter, the employee sought permanent disability benefits from the board, and the
employer asserted -his statutory right to credit the third party recovery
against his liability for these future payments."' The employee raised
the employer's concurrent negligence as a bar to this claim. The board
dismissed the employee's defense and allowed the employer his credit.
The court of appeal in Nelsen annulled the board's order and held that
the employee could raise the employer's concurrent negligence as a bar
to his assertion of credit. This decision, then, allowed the employee
to retain both his third party recovery and his permanent disability
award.
The Nelsen opinion is important in two respects. First, it held
that an employer's concurrent negligence will bar his assertion of
credit; and second, it held that the employee (as opposed to the third
party in Witt) can raise this defense before the WCAB, with the benefits inuring to the employee himself in the form of a double recovery.
The Nelsen court based its decision almost entirely on its interpretation and application of Witt v. Jackson.63 The court pointed out the
distinction between the reimbursement and credit provisions of the subrogation statutes 4 and the fact that Witt dealt only with the reimbursement sections. 6" Nevertheless, the court reasoned that since the court
in Witt held that the reimbursement sections were implicitly qualified
by the statement in Civil Code section 35176 that "no one can take
advantage of his own wrong," the credit provision should be similarly
interpreted, thus barring an employer from using them if he is found
concurrently negligent. 67
In so holding, the court in Nelsen had to decide which party
should receive the benefits of the ruling-the employee, who would
thereby be allowed a double recovery, or the third party, who would
thereby receive an increased Witt deduction. The court ruled in favor
of a double recovery for the employee.
As discussed earlier,6 8 the court in Witt held that the third party
should be allowed to deduct the amount of reimbursement from the
judgment against him on a finding of concurrent employer negligence
in order to prevent the employee from receiving a double recovery.
62. See CAL.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

LABOR CODE

§§ 3858, 3861 (West 1971).

57 Cal. 2d 57, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 366 P.2d 641 (1961).
See notes 8-10 & accompanying text supra.
11 Cal. App. 3d at 478-79, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
CAL. Crv. CODE § 3517 (West 1970).
11 Cal. App. 3d at 478-79, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
See notes 19-32 & accompanying text supra.
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The court in Nelsen dealt with this part of the Witt holding by reasoning that the reliance in Witt on Code of Civil Procedure sections 875
through 880, which allow for contribution among joint tortfeasors,6 9 was
"merely to demonstrate that the rationale of prior decisions was no
longer applicable . . . . The decision in Witt is in terms not made
to depend upon these sections, which have, in fact, no direct bearing
on the question decided in the Witt case." 70 By this reasoning, the
Nelsen court attempted to separate the Witt holding into two parts.
The court chose to retain, and to extend to the credit provisions, that
portion of Witt which holds that the employer may not "take advantage
of -his own wrong." At the same time, the court extracted this holding
from the context of Witt, which was an attempt to allocate liability for
loss between two wrongdoers. Certainly, the court in Witt did not base
its opinion on sections 875 through 880 for these provisions would have
directed that the court allow equal contribution between the employer
and the third party, rather than limiting the employer's "contribution"
to the amount of benefits paid to the employee up until the time of
trial. 71 Nonetheless, the court in Witt did rely on the legislative intent
behind these sections, that concurrent wrongdoers should each assume
a portion of the 1oss.72 To split up the Witt holding, retaining one part
and attempting to distinguish the other, is wholly inconsistent with Justice Traynor's equitable formulation for the distribution of loss between
the third party and the employer.
By denying both the negligent employer's claim for credit and the
third party's claim for an enlarged Witt reduction, the holding in Nelsen
allowed the employee a double recovery for a single injury. The employee, under Nelsen, was permitted to retain all future workers' compensation benefits in addition to the damages recovered from the third
party. The Nelsen court's justification for this result is not persuasive.
The court acknowledged the holding in Witt that " 'the injured employee may not be allowed a double recovery. . ..
In its only
attempt to qualify this repudiation of double recovery, the opinion in
Nelsen quoted language from De Cruz v. Reid,' 4 a post-Witt supreme
court decision:
'

",73

69. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §§ 875-80 (West Supp. 1975).
70. 11 Cal. App. 3d at 476, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 640, quoting Chick v. Superior Ct.,
209 Cal. App. 2d 201, 204, 25 Cal. Rptr. 725, 727 (1962).
71. Technically, the concurrently negligent employer and the third party tortfeasor
are not joint tortfeasors. Under California workers' compensation law, the employer
is not liable to the employee in tort. CAL. LABOR CODE § 601 (West 1971). For a
full discussion of this issue, see 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 76.21
(1975); Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 977 (1957).
72. See notes 20-32 & accompanying text supra.
73. 11 Cal. App. 3d at 476-77, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 640, quoting Witt v. Jackson, 57
Cal. 2d 57, 73, 366 P.2d 641, 650, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 378 (1961).
74. 69 Cal. 2d 217, 444 P.2d 342, 70 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1968).
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Witt's prohibition against double recovery "is nothing more than a
reference to the usual rule of law existing in negligence actions generally, that a partial satisfaction of the liability by a joint or concurrent tortfeasor will result7 in
5 a pro tanto reduction of ithe liability
of the original tortfeasor."
When this statement is considered in context, however, it becomes
apparent that the Nelsen court's reliance on De Cruz is misplaced. An
examination of De Cruz readily reveals that it stands not for the notion
that an employee should be allowed a double recovery, but rather for
the proposition that he should not be allowed a double recovery in the
case of a concurrently negligent employer.
In De Cruz an employee was killed in a work-related accident.
His dependents filed a claim with the WCAB for workers' compensation benefits. The employer and employee settled this claim for a specified amount, and the employer further agreed to waive any right to
subrogation. 6
The dependents then brought a successful wrongful death action
against the third party tortfeasor. On appeal to the supreme court, the
third party claimed that it was error for the trial court not to have deducted from the judgment against him the amount of the settlement
agreement between the employer and employee in order to prevent the
employee from obtaining a double recovery prohibited by Witt. The
supreme court in De Cruz correctly rejected this claim.
Emphasizing the employer's lack of negligence in De Cruz as the
factor which distinguished it from Witt, the court reasoned that the Witt
reduction and rule against double recovery apply only in the case of
a concurrently negligent employer.77 Since there had been no showing
of concurrent negligence in De Cruz, the third party was not allowed
a Witt reduction of the judgment against him. 78 Consequently, the employee in De Cruz retained the third party damages and the settlement
amount. This apparent double recovery, however, resulted only because the non-negligent employer in De Cruz had waived his subroga79
tion rights as part consideration for the settlement with the employee.
In the absence of such a waiver, the non-negligent employer unquestionably would have had the right to reimbursement, thus reducing the
75. 11 Cal. App. 3d at 477, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 640 (1970), quoting De Cruz v.
Reid, 69 Cal. 2d 217, 225-26, 444 P.2d 342, 348, 70 Cal. Rptr. 550, 556 (1968).
76. De Cruz v. Reid, 69 Cal. 2d 217, 221, 444 P.2d 342, 344-45, 70 Cal. Rptr.
550, 552-53 (1968).
77. Id. at 225, 444 P.2d at 348, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
78. Id. at 223, 444 P.2d at 346, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 554. See note 81 infra.
79. 69 Cal. 2d at 221, 444 P.2d at 344-45, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53. The court
in De Cruz called the compensation benefits received by the employee because of the
non-negligent employer's waiver of his reimbursement rights "payments received ...
from a collateral source." Id. at 223, 444 P.2d at 346, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
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third party damages ultimately received
by the employee and eliminat80
ing the employee's double recovery.
Furthermore, since the employer had not been found concurrently
negligent, the settlement recovery obtained by the employee from the
employer was not a "partial satisfaction of the liability by a joint or concurrent tortfeasor [which] will result in a pro tanto reduction of the
liability of the other tortfeasors."' l
Thus, while the court in De Cruz reaffirmed the rule stated in Witt
that when an employer is concurrently negligent, a double recovery by
the employee is not permitted,82 it was careful not to extend the Witt
prohibition against double recovery to the case of an independent recovery by the employee which was gained solely because of the nonnegligent employer's waiver of his subrogation fights. It is within this
context that the part of the De Cruz opinion cited by the court in Nelsen must be read."3
Consequently, the appellate court's assertion in Nelsen that De
Cruz somehow qualified the double recovery prohibition in the case of
a concurrently negligent employer and thereby lent support to the Nelsen court's allowance of double recovery is erroneous. The holding
in Nelsen must therefore be viewed skeptically.
Further reasoning by the Nelsen court is also questionable. The
court concluded its opinion by stating that the holding would not impose
any additional liability upon the employer:
They [the employers] pay no more than they would have had to
pay if, prior to the third party actions, petitioners had received
awards and payments for all permanent disability indemnity and
other8 4workmen's compensation benefits which they concurrently
seek.
This statement is misleading. Earlier in its opinion the court correctly pointed out the difference between the credit and reimbursement
80. See note 18 & accompanying text supra.
81. 69 Cal. 2d at 225-26, 444 P.2d at 348, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 556. See note 75
& accompanying text supra. Throughout De Cruz, the supreme court stressed the employer's lack of negligence as the factor which distinguished the case from Witt. The
court stated: "In the case at bench defendants neither introduced nor offered any evidence bearing upon the concurrent negligence of decedent's employer, let alone any evidence that such negligence proximately caused decedent's death. Accordingly, they did
not bring themselves within our holding in Witt requiring a reduction of the judgment."
69 Cal. 2d at 223, 444 P.2d at 346, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
82. The court stated: "In support of their position that plaintiffs' recovery in the
instant case must be reduced, defendants fasten upon our closing observation in Witt that
'the injured employee may not be allowed a double recovery'. But this language must
be read in the factual context of a concurrently negligent employer." Id. at 225, 444
P.2d at 347-48, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 555-56 (citation omitted).
83. See note 75 & accompanying text supra.
84. 11 Cal. App. 3d at 479, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
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provisions.1s Indeed, the thrust of its initial reasoning was that the rule
that "no one can take advantage of his own wrong" should be extended
to apply to the credit provisions as well as the reimbursement provisions. 86 Nonetheless, in its subsequent conclusion that its decisions
would not result in any new employer liability, the court hypothesized
a reimbursement rather than a credit situation. 7 There is no question
that in this hypothetical factual situation the holding would not impose
any additional liability, for it merely illustrates the reimbursement situation which was decided in Witt. It is clear that when as in the actual
situation in Nelsen, the court considers workers' compensation payments which were not paid by the time of trial but rather will be paid
in the future (the credit amount), the Nelsen decision does indeed cast
new liability on the employer, for he will be required to subsidize the

employee's double recovery consisting of future workers' compensation

benefits and damages assessed against the third party.88
In sum, the Nelsen court took the logical position that the reason-

ing in Witt, which modified the reimbursement provisions in light of
Civil Code section 3517,9 should be extended to modify the credit provisions. Nevertheless, instead of allowing the third party to deduct
from the judgment against him the amount of the credit, a solution
which would have been consistent with Witt, the court allowed the employee to retain both the judgment and the future benefits. This position is irreconcilable with both Witt and De Cruz.
Corley v. WCAB
The second pre-Roe appellate decision addressing the issue of a

concurrently negligent employer's right to a credit was the later case

of Corley v. WCAB. 90 In Corley, the Fourth District, contrary to the
85. Id. at 478-79, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 479-80, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 641. The court here mentioned that all the
workers' compensation benefits had been paid prior to the third party action. Id.
Thus, the court plainly referred to a reimbursement situation. See notes 8-10 & accompanying text supra.
88. It is true that the court in Nelsen did not increase the employer's total potential liability beyond the limits of the employee's workers' compensation award. The extent of potential total liability, however, is really not at issue here. Rather, what is in
issue is the actual amount which the negligent employer will be required to pay in workers' compensation benefits without receiving any setoff. Before Nelsen, pursuant to
Labor Code sections 3858 and 3861, the negligent employer was allowed a setoff against
the third party judgment for the amount of post-trial workers' compensation benefits he
was obligated to pay (the credit amount). After Nelsen, this setoff was denied. Hence,
the employer's total actual liability to the employee was clearly increased by the Nelsen
holding.
89. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3517 (West 1970).
90. 22 Cal. App. 3d 447, 99 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1971).
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position taken earlier by the Third District in Nelsen, held that the employer's concurrent negligence would not bar his assertion of credit."
The facts in Corley were similar to those in Nelsen; however in
Corley, the third party tortfeasor and employee settled their suit without a determination regarding the employer's negligence.1 2 Thus,
when the employee came before the WCAB and asserted the employer's negligence as a bar to the employer's request for credit, he was
asking the board not only to deny the employer his credit, if negligence
were found, but also to determine whether or not the employer had
in fact been negligent.93
The trial referee permitted the employee to introduce evidence
of the employer's concurrent negligence and, after submission of the
matter, decided that the board had jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue
of the employer's concurrent negligence. 94 The referee then determined that the employee's injury had been caused by the concurrent
negligence of the employer and the third party. Accordingly, the employer was denied credit for any part of the amount recovered from
the third party, and an award was issued in favor of the employee. 5
The WCAB, on motion for reconsideration, overturned the referee's
decision insofar as it denied the employer his credit, determining that
the WCAB did not have jurisdiction to decide the question of employer
negligence. The court of appeal in Corley affirmed the decision of
the WCAB, holding that the employer's concurrent negligence does not
bar his assertion of credit. 6
The Corley court, like the court in Nelsen, based its opinion upon
an interpretation of Witt v. Jackson.9 7 In its application of Witt, however, the court in Corley arrived at a significantly different result.
The Corley court interpreted Witt as directing an allocation of the
economic cost of an injury between a third party tortfeasor and a concurrently negligent employer, with the negligent employer bearing the
cost to the extent of workers' compensation benefits paid, and the third
party tortfeasor bearing the cost in excess thereof.9 8 The court reasoned that both types of subrogation statutes (reimbursement and
credit) were enacted to prevent the employee from retaining third
party damages as well as workers' compensation benefits.9 9 Witt, the
91.

Id. at 459, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 250.

92.
93.

Id. at 450, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
Id. at 450-51, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 244.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
57
22

99.

Id. at 453, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 245.

at 451, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
at 459, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961).
Cal. App. 3d at 454, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
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court stated, did not alter the statutory scheme precluding double recovery; indeed, it expressly reaffirmed that principle. 0 0 In the absence of the workers' compensation law, the concurrently negligent employer would be a joint tortfeasor, liable for contribution to the third
party tortfeasor under sections 875 through 880 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. 1' 0
Under workers' compensation law, the insured employer is not liable in tort; instead, he is liable solely for workers' compensation benefits, and his obligation to pay attaches irrespective of
negligence. Despite this rationale, the court reasoned that the entire
financial burden should not fall on the third party when the employer
is concurrently negligent.-0 2 Therefore, the court in Corley concluded:
Thus understood, the decision in Witt v. Jackson . . . is seen to
be an attempt at mitigating this inequity by adjusting the respective
rights and obligations between the
third party tortfeasor and the
03
concurrently negligent employer.1
This analysis of the holding in Witt is eminently sound. The court
persuasively argued that Witt was concerned not with the rights of the
employee vis-A-vis the employer, but rather with the rights of the employer vis-h-vis the third party. This conclusion is further supported by
the fact that the holding in Witt
had the effect of leaving the injured employee completely neutral
as to the issue of the employer's concurrent negligence.... If the
employer were found not to be negligent, the employer would obtain reimbursement thereby reducing -the employee's third party recovery. If the employer were found to be concurrently negligent,
the employee's third party recovery would nevertheless be reduced
by the same amount to the benefit of the third party tortfeasor.
In neither event could the employee obtain double recovery.' 04
The Corley court then considered the applicability of the Witt rationale to the credit provisions. The court noted that logically, the rationale should be extended to the credit provisions, with the result that
the third party would receive a larger Witt reduction from the judgment
against him. 105 Nevertheless, the court felt compelled by the Conner,
Castro, and Slayton decisions to rule out this possibility. 1 6 Thus, the
court in Corley was left with two alternatives: either to bar the negligent employer's right to credit, thereby allowing, as in Nelsen, an expressly prohibited double recovery for the employee; or to allow the
100. Id. at 453, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
101. Id. at 453-54, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 246, citing CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc.
(West Supp. 1975).
102. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 454, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 454-55, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
105. Id. at 455, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
106. See notes 41-52 & accompanying text supra.

§§ 875-880
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employer his credit rights regardless of his negligence. The court
chose the latter course and offered three main reasons for its decision.10 7 First, to decide otherwise would allow the employee a double
recovery. Second, the Nelsen approach would lead to a great deal of
gamesmanship among the parties involved. Third, the authority of the
board to determine the negligence of the employer in cases in which
the issue has not previously been decided by a court is questionable.
The first of these lines of reasoning has been previously discussed
at some length.' 08 The second will be covered in detail later in this
note.' 9 The third concern of the Corley court, however, requires
some comment at this point.
Scope of WCAB Jurisdiction-TheCorley View
The constitutionality of a board determination of employer negligence was never an issue in Nelsen because negligence had previously
been determined by the trial court in the third party action. 10 In Corley, however, the employee and the third party settled without deciding
the question of employer negligence. Therefore, a holding in Corley
that the employer's credit rights were barred by his concurrent negligence would have required a finding that the board had jurisdiction to
decide the issue of employer negligence. Since the court held instead
that the employer should be allowed credit regardless of his negligence,
its treatment of the issue of the board's jurisdiction to hear a negligence
claim is dictum. Nevertheless, in view of the importance of the issue
in Roe v. WCAB,"' the Corley court's analysis should be considered.
The court in Corley reasoned that the WCAB is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and has no power beyond that granted by the California
Constitution." 2 The relevant section of the constitution expressly pro107.
108.
109.

22 Cal. App. 3d 447, 99 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1972)
See notes 73-88 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 213-15 & accompanying text infra.

(passim).

110. See 22 Cal. App. 3d at 459, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 250. A holding in favor of the
board's jurisdiction was implicit in the Nelsen holding, however. Id.
111.
112.

12 Cal. 3d 884, 528 P.2d 771, 117 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1974).
The constitution provides: "The Legislature is hereby expressly vested with

plenary power, unlimited by any provision of this constitution, to create, and enforce
a complete system of workers' compensation, by appropriate legislation . . . irrespective
of the fault of any party.

A complete system of workmen's compensation includes . . .

full provision for vesting power, authority and jurisdiction in an administrative body
with all the requisite governmental functions to determine any dispute or matter arising
under such legislation, to the end that the administration of such legislation shall accomplish substantial justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and without incumbrance of any character; all of which matters are expressly declared to be the social pub-

lic policy of this State, binding upon all departments of the State Government."
CONST. art. XX, § 21.

CAL.
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vides for the establishment of a compensation system "irrespective of
the fault of any party."11 Moreover, section 3861 of the Labor Code,
which empowers the board to award the employer a credit, does not
1 14
condition this power upon the employer's lack of negligence.
Therefore, the court concluded, to find that the board has jurisdiction
to adjudicate the issue of the employer's negligence would "raise serious constitutional questions."' 5 The court acknowledged, however,
that while these sections "suggest the absence of jurisdiction, they are
not conclusive."" 6 The court's position on this point is certainly persuasive; however the opposite position, which supports the jurisdiction
of the board, has considerable merit as well.
In analyzing whether the board has jurisdiction to determine the
employer's negligence, it is necessary to realize that "fault determination" may be viewed in two conceptual frameworks. Within the first
framework, the board would predicate the employee's workers' compensation recovery on a finding of employer fault or negligence.
Within the second framework, the board would be allowed to determine the negligence of the employer solely for the purpose of adjusting the respective liabilities of an employer and a third party tortfeasor.
The first type of fault determination, which concerns the relationship
between the employee and the employer, is clearly inconsistent with
a constitutional mandate of a compensation system based on "no
fault. 11 7 In contrast, the second type involves the relationship between the employer and the third party, a relationship not subsumed
under the constitutional no fault standard, and is therefore constitutionally acceptable. 1 8
The dissent in Corley articulated three additional reasons which
lend support to the position that the board does have jurisdiction to determine employer negligence.' 19 Labor Code section 3861 empowers
the board to determine the employer's right to credit. 20 Indeed, in
Slayton it was held that the board had exclusive jurisdiction in this regard.1 -' Thus, by implication, it could be argued that the statute like113. Id.
114. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3861 (West 1971). See note 10 & accompanying text
supra.
115. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 459, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
116. Id. at 460, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
117. See note 112 supra.
118. The two references in the California Constitution to the "no fault" nature of
the California workers' compensation system are solely in the context of the employer's
obligation to compensate workers for injuries suffered in the scope of their employment.
No language supports the proposition that the "no fault" concept should preclude adjustment of liability between the employer and the third party.
119. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 463-64, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 253 (dissenting opinion).
120. See note 10 supra.
121. Slayton v. Wright, 271 Cal. App. 2d 219, 76 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1969).
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wise authorizes the board to resolve all questions related to the issue
of credit, including that of employer negligence. 1 22 In addition, the
decision in Witt did inject the issue of liability, as between the third
party and the employer, into the workers' compensation act through its
holding that a finding of employer negligence bars the employer's assertion of his reimbursement rights.1 21 Finally, Labor Code sections
4551 and 4553124 presently grant the board jurisdiction to determine
the issue of fault in serious and willful misconduct cases.
In conclusion, then, as to the question of the board's jurisdiction
to hear and determine the issue of employer negligence, both the majority's opinion denying jurisdiction and the dissent's position supporting jurisdiction have considerable credibility.
ProblemsRaised by Corley
Under the holding in Corley, time factors alone significantly affect
the substantive rights of both the third party tortfeasor and the employer. 25 For example, the sooner an employee brings an action
against a third party, the smaller the amount of workers' compensation
benefits .he will have received by the time of trial. Thus, the Witt reduction available to the third party if the employer is found concurrently negligent becomes continuously smaller as the trial date is moved
closer to the time of injury. On the other hand, the amount to which
the employer is entitled as a credit increases, and consequently the
third party bears an increasingly large portion of the overall financial
burden. Conversely, as the trial date is moved farther away from the
date of the injury, the benefit to the tortfeasor and the detriment to
the employer are increased. In either case, the proportional shares of
the monetary award paid to the injured employee by the third party
and the concurrently negligent employer are not in any way tied to their
comparative degrees of fault in causing the injury. The allocation of
the burden of the cost of the injury is determined solely by the vagaries
of time.
122.

Corley v. WCAB, 22 Cal. App. 3d 447, 463-64, 99 Cal. Rptr. 242, 253 (1972)

(dissenting opinion).
123. Id. at 464, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
124. Section 4551 provides: "Where the injury is caused by the serious and willful
misconduct of the injured employee, the compensation otherwise recoverable therefor
CAL. LABOR CODE § 4551 (West 1971 & Supp.
shall be reduced one-half, except ......
1975).
Section 4553 provides: "The amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall
be increased one-half where the employee is injured by reason of the serious and willful
misconduct of. . . the employer, or his managing representative." Id. § 4553.
125. See Patterson v. Sharp, 10 Cal. App. 3d 990, 997-98, 89 Cal. Rptr. 396, 40001 (1970). See note 56 & accompanying text supra.
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In summation, the appellate decisions prior to Roe struggled with
the problem of the respective claims of the third party, the employer,
and the employee to the monetary amount of post-trial workers' compensation benefits. Conner, Castro, Slayton and Patterson held that
the third party was not entitled to extend his Witt reduction to workers'
compensation benefits to be paid after the time of trial. Nelsen gave
this credit amount to the employee, thereby allowing him a double recovery consisting of the workers' compensation benefits and the damage recovery from the third party. In contrast, Corley denied the employee a double recovery and allowed the employer to claim the credit
amount. Presented with this conflict in the courts of appeal, the California Supreme Court granted a hearing in Roe v. WCAB 120 in order
to resolve the credit controversy.

Roe v. WCAB
In Roe the supreme court encountered a factual situation identical
to that which had confronted the appellate court in Corley. 2 7 Contrary to the opinion in Corley, however, the court in Roe held that the
employer's negligence bars his assertion of credit; moreover, the court
squarely held that the board has jurisdiction to determine the issue of
employer negligence. 12 The effect of this holding has been to allow
the employee to keep both his future workers' compensation benefits
and his third party damage recovery.
The court reasoned that Witt involved the interplay of two policies:
[the] denial of the concurrently negligent employer's recovery
from the third party was premised on the law's policy to prevent
the former from taking advantage of his own wrong; while the latter's credit for workmen's compensation against his own tort liability was grounded
on the policy of denying the employee double re29
covery.1
The court considered that its task in Roe was to select one of these
policies or to reconcile the two.' 30 Unable to pursue the latter course,
the court chose to affirm the rationale in Nelsen that the policy of preventing the employer from profiting from his own negligence outweighs
the policy against double recovery by the employee. 3 1 The court
126. 12 Cal. 3d 884, 528 P.2d 771, 117 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1974).
127. See notes 33-39 & accompanying text supra.
128. 12 Cal. 3d at 891-92, 528 P.2d at 776-77, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 688-89. The supreme court in Roe, perhaps ill-advisedly, adopted as its opinion the court of appeal
decision written by Justice Friedman and concurred in by Justices Regan and Janes. S'ee
id. at 886, 528 P.2d at 773, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
129. Id. at 888, 528 P.2d at 774, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 888-89, 528 P.2d at 774-75, 117 Cal. Rptr. 686-87.
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clearly rejected the approach adopted in Corley, finding that this approach "embraced the inhibition against double recovery even at the
cost of permitting 13
a 2negligent employer to reduce his workmen's compensation liability."'
The court in Roe offered three principal rationales in support of
its position. First, the court found that it is the third party rather than
133
the employer who provides the employee with the double recovery.
Second, the court reasoned that the subrogation provisions contained
in the Labor Code 34 are "primarily procedural, substantive only in isolated aspects."' 33 Third, relying principally on the procedural delegation of authority which the board receives under section 3861 of the
Labor Code," 3 6 the court concluded that the board has jurisdiction to
determine the issue of employer negligence.
The first of these rationales appears to be the heart of the opinion
in Roe. The court cited De Cruz v. Reid for the proposition that Witt
v. Jackson was not "a sweeping interdict against double recovery.' 37
The essence of the court's argument is contained in the following paragraph:
Especially if he is vulnerable to the charge of negligence, the
employer may avoid participation in the third party lawsuit; the
third party, as defendant, may litigate or settle without seeking
credit for the workmen's compensation payments. When the employer/carrier then goes before the appeals board protesting the
employee's double recovery, one asks: "What's Hecuba to him or
he to Hecuba, that he should weep for her?" If the employer's
negligence contributed to the accident, the double recovery was
gained not from him but from the third party, who did not claim
a deduction for employer negligence. If the employer was free of
negligence, he gained (but did not assert) a subrogated right to recover his compensation payment as damages. 13
The court's analysis here completely confuses the distinction between the reimbursement sections and the credit sections of the subrogation statutes. The court in Roe was presented with the issue of what
role the employer's concurrent negligence should play in the credit situation. Nonetheless, the situation which the court described above in
132.
133.

Id.
Id. at 889, 528 P.2d at 775, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 687.

134.

CAL. LABOR CODE

§§ 3850-64 (West 1971 & Supp. 1975).

See notes 3-18 &

accompanying text supra.

135.
136.

12 Cal. 3d at 889, 528 P.2d at 775, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 687 (1974).
Id. at 891, 528 P.2d at 776, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 688. See note 10 & accompany-

ing text supra.
137. 12 Cal. 3d at 889, 528 P.2d at 775, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 687. For a full discussion of De Cruz, see notes 74-83 & accompanying text supra.

138.

12 Cal. 3d at 889, 528 P.2d 775, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 687, quoting W.
Act II, sc. ii.

SPEARE, HAMLET,

SHAKcE-
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explaining the effect of its holding involves reimbursement rather than
credit. This confusion between the two distinct types of remedies led
the court to the erroneous conclusion that its decision would affect not
the employer, but only the third party.
The fact that the Roe court described a reimbursement situation
above is clear. For example, the court stated: "the double recovery
was gained not from the employer but from the third party, who did
not claim a deduction for employer negligence."''1 9 Under Roe itself,
however, as well as under the earlier appellate decisions discussed previously,140 the third party can claim a deduction only for benefits paid
up to the time of trial (the reimbursement amount); he can never claim
a deduction for future workers' compensation benefits (the credit
amount). 14 ' Moreover, the Roe court went on to state: "If the employer was free of negligence, he gained (but did not assert) a subrogated right to recover his compensation payments as damages."' 42
This statement, too, describes a reimbursement situation in which the
employer, by choosing not to join the third party suit, has voluntarily
waived his right to "recover" payments made before trial.
The factual situation described by the Roe court thus envisions the
highly unlikely circumstance in whioh at trial the third party does not
assert the employer's negligence (the "Witt defense") and the employer does not assert his right to reimbursement. Only in this event
can an employee, in a reimbursement situation, obtain the double re-'
covery to which the Roe court referred in its statement above.
Furthermore, because the facts hypothesized by the court in Roe
describe a reimbursement situation, the court's statement that the employer was protesting the employee's double recovery in front of the
WCAB is incorrect and misleading. The board has no jurisdiction to
award the employer his reimbursement remedy; only a court can grant
reimbursement. 43 The employer could not, then, have protested the
employee's double recovery of the reimbursement amount in front of
the board. Under these contrived circumstances, the employer should
certainly not be complaining about the employee's double recovery, because the damage he has suffered is solely the result of his own over139. 12 Cal. 3d at 889, 528 P.2d at 775, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
140. Patterson v. Sharp, 10 Cal. App. 3d 990, 89 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1970); Slayton
v. Wright, 271 Cal. App. 2d 219, 76 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1969); Castro v. Fowler Equip.
Co., 233 Cal. App. 2d 416, 43 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1965); Conner v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 263, 41 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1964).
141. See notes 41-58 & accompanying text supra.
142. 12 Cal. 3d at 889, 528 P.2d at 775, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 687. See note 138 &
accompanying text supra.
143. Roe v. WCAB, 12 Cal. 3d 884, 896-97, 528 P.2d 771, 780, 117 Cal. Rptr; 683,
692 (1974) (Burke, I., dissenting). See notes 8-14 & accompanying text supra.
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sight in neither filing a lien claim in the damages action between the
third party and the employee nor bringing an independent action
against the third party.
By contrast, in the context of a credit situation, which is the matter exclusively affected by the Roe decision, the -holding in Roe will
indeed cause the employer to lament the extent of the employee's recovery.144 In holding that an employer's concurrent negligence bars
his right to a credit, 4 ' the court in Roe sharply curtailed the employer's
remedies. The negligent employer will not be allowed to utilize the
credit provisions which permit him to offset the third party recovery
against his liability for future workers' compensation benefits. The
employer, then, must subsidize a double recovery 4 6 by the employee
consisting of future worker compensation benefits and the third party
1 47
recovery.

The second part of the three-pronged rationale of the court in Roe
focused on an analysis of the Labor Code subrogation provisions, sections 3858 and 3861.118 The court initially described these provisions
as "primarily procedural, substantive only in isolated aspects."' 14 9 In
addition, the court distinguished between the literal meaning of the
statutes and the manner in which these provisions have been interpreted "substantively" by the case law.' 50 Then, however, the court
modified its original description of the statutes stating that section 3858
is "more substantive than procedural,"'' as it relieves the employer
from paying post-trial compensation up to the amount of the employee's
damage recovery. This section's "procedural implementation," the
court maintained, is section 3861, which designates the WCAB as "a
forum for adjudicating the employer's untried claim for reimbursement
or credit."' 152 Furthermore, the court stated that the Witt opinion had
construed sections 3858 and 3861,' 53 had held that they were qualified
144.

For a similar discussion in relation to the Nelsen case, see notes 84-85 & ac-

companying text supra.

145. 12 Cal. 3d at 890, 528 P.2d at 776, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
146. The court, however, urged that "it is doubtful. . . whether a double recovery
is created by a settlement which does not cover the totality of claims, including those
of the employer." 12 Cal. 3d at 889, 528 P.2d at 775, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 687. Assuming
for argument's sake that this statement is true, the court's holding is not restricted to
only the settlement situation but will extend to a prior judgment, as well.

See 12 Cal.

3d at 892, 528 P.2d at 777, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 689. In the latter case, the employee's
double recovery is apparent.
147. Id. at 895, 528 P.2d at 779, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 891 (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
148. See note 10 & accompanying text supra.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

12 Cal. 3d at 889, 528 P.2d at 775, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
Id. at 889-90, 528 P.2d at 775, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
Id. at 890, 528 P.2d at 775, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
Id. at 890, 528 P.2d at 775-76, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 687-88.
Id. at 890, 528 P.2d at 776, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
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by Civil Code section 351714 and had therefore concluded that a negligent employer is precluded from taking "advantage of the reimbursement remedies that those sections provided."' 5 5 The Roe court determined that the WCAB had therefore erred in viewing section 3861 as
substantive authority for granting the employer his credit regardless of
his concurrent negligence, since "[t]he employer's concurrent negligence will defeat his claim to credit."' 56
It is submitted that the above reasoning is plainly incorrect in
parts, and completely misleading as a whole. The court's "procedural-

substantive" analysis of the subrogation statutes is unsound. The workers' compensation system is set up entirely by statute; it has no common

law origins. 157 It is therefore difficult to understand the court's statement that the subrogation provisions are "primarily procedural, substantive only in isolated aspects," since the only substantive rights which
the parties have within the workers' compensation system are estab-

lished by the statutes themselves.' 58

Moreover, the only authority

cited by the court in support of this statement is totally inapposite.5 9
The court complicated this analysis by the contradictory statement

that section 3858 "is more substantive than procedural,"'160 while section 3861 is merely its "procedural implementation."'-'
This statement is only partially correct. Section 3861 does authorize the board
to determine the credit issue.'6 2 Nevertheless, section 3861 also creates substantive rights. Whereas section 3858, by its wording, allows
the employer a right to credit against the employee's third party judgment only, section 3861 allows the employer his credit rights against

the employee's judgment and settlement with the third party. Thus,
154. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 3517 (West 1970).
155. 12 Cal. 3d at 890, 528 P.2d at 775, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 688, quoting Witt v.
Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 72, 366 P.2d 641, 648, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 377 (1961).
156. 12 Cal. 3d at 890, 528 P.2d at 776, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
157. See Note, Workmen's Compensation and Third Party Suits: The Aftermath
of Witt v. Jackson, 21 HAsTiNGs L.J. 661, 662 (1970).
158. Id. at 661-64. See Nelsen v. WCAB, 11 Cal. App. 3d 472, 477, 89 Cal. Rptr.
638, 640 (1970).
159. The only case law which the court cited in support of its position was a footnote in a decision of the court of appeal. 12 Cal. 3d at 887, 528 P.2d at 775, 117 Cal.
Rptr. at 687, citing Van Nuis v. Los Angeles Soap Co., 36 Cal. App. 3d 222, 228 n.2;
111 Cal. Rptr. 398, 401 (1973). This reliance on Van Nuis is misplaced. In this footnote, the appellate court had referred to only the 1972 amendments to sections 3859 and
3860, declaring that "the amendments affect only the procedure for enforcing a claim
for reimbursement. . . ." Van Nuis v. Los Angeles Soap Co., 36 Cal. App. 3d 222,
228 n.2, 111 Cal. Rptr. 398, 401 (1973).
160. 12 Cal. 3d at 890, 528 P.2d at 775, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 687. See note 151 &
accompanying text supra.
161. 12 Cal. 3d at 890, 528 P.2d at 775, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 687. See note 152 &
accompanying text supra.
162. See note 10 & accompanying text supra.
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section 3861 is not merely a "procedural implementation" of section
3858. Indeed, in Roe itself, Labor Code section 3858 would not have
offered the employer any possible relief, for he attempted to assert a
credit against the third party settlement, which is exclusively covered

by section 3861.
The distinction which the court drew between the literal meaning
of the subrogation statutes and the manner in which these statutes have
been interpreted "substantively" by the case law 618 is also faulty. The
court's reasoning implies that courts are free to disregard the literal
meaning of statutes which they interpret. Thus, the opinion seems to
suggest that the courts establish the "substantive" law of workers' compensation, while the statutes are somehow of secondary importance.

This proposition not only is unsupported by the two examples cited by
the court, 64 but also is a gross distortion of the proper relationship between statutory and case law.

Contrary to the position taken by the

court in Roe, it seems axiomatic that courts are free to interpret, but
not to disregard, the wording of applicable statutes.
The court's most serious error in this second part of its three part
rationale is its confusion of the reimbursement and credit situations.
The court stated that section 3861 gives the board the authority to adjudicate the employer's untried claim for "reimbursement or credit."'-6 5
In so stating, the court apparently misread section 3861. As pointed
163. See note 150 & accompanying text supra.
164. 12 Cal. 3d at 889-90, 528 P.2d at 775, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 687. In its first
example, the court maintained that although section 3852 by its literal wording would
allow a double recovery, decisional law, primarily Witt v. Jackson, has imposed a "substantive" limitation on the employee's double recovery of damages. Id. This reading
of section 3852 is inaccurate. Section 3852 expressly provides for the employer's subrogation rights, in order to preclude a double recovery by the employee. See notes 6-7
supra. Thus the court in Witt, rather than overruling the statutory language, as the
court in Roe implied, merely gave the statutory language its full meaning.
The second example cited by the court in Roe is also inaccurate. The court stated
that the literal wording of sections 3852, 3854, 3856, and 3860(b) "permit the employer's unqualified recovery of compensation payments from the negligent third party; yet
substantive law rejects his claim if he has been concurrently negligent." 12 Cal. 3d at
889-90, 528 P.2d at 775, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 687. Again, the court has mischaracterized
these statutory provisions. Contrary to the Roe court's assertion, Justice Traynor in
Witt v. Jackson expressly stated: "[T]here is nothing in the Labor Code to suggest that
the Legislature contemplated that a negligent employer could take advantage of the reimbursement remedies that those sections provide. In the absence of express terms to the
contrary, these provisions must be deemed to be qualified by Civil Code section 3517
which provides that 'No one can take advantage of his own wrong.'" 57 Cal. 2d at
72, 366 P.2d at 649, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 377. This statement by the court in Witt clearly
indicates that rather than contradicting the language of the statutes, the court was attempting to give the language its intended effect.
165. 12 Cal. 3d at 890, 528 P.2d at 775-76, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 687-88. See note
152 & accompanying text supra.

January 1976]

ROE v. WCAB

out previously, the employer can recover his reimbursement only by
one of the three methods provided in sections 3852, 3853 and 3856
(b). 166 With all three of these methods, the determining body is a
court, not the WCAB. In contrast, section 673861 empowers only the
board to hear the employer's claim for credit.1
Perhaps the most flagrant example of the Roe court's confusion
of the reimbursement and credit provisions is the finding that the court
in Witt v. Jackson construed sections 3858 and 3861 and determined
that they were qualified by Civil Code section 3517, which provides
that "no one can take advantage of -his own wrong."'1 68 The court's
reliance here on Witt is entirely misplaced. In Witt, the court did not
even consider sections 3858 and 3861, as it was concerned solely with
the reimbursement sections, 3852, 3853, and 3856(b). 119 By stating
that Witt construed sections 3858 and 3861 to be unavailable to a concurrently negligent employer, the Roe court is begging the very question which it had to decide: whether or not an employer's concurrent
negligence bars the assertion of his credit rights.
In the third portion of the opinion, the court in Roe considered
whether the board has jurisdiction to decide the issue of employer negligence, concluding that it does have this power.' 70 The court reviewed
the California constitutional provision for workers' compensation' 7' and reasoned that directing the board to grant an automatic credit
to the employer, without regard to the issue of his negligence, would
manifest a preference for the employer/carrier over and against the interests of the injured workman, who "is the prime object of constitutional
solicitude.' 17 2 The court reasoned further -that-allowing the board to decide whether the employee may keep his entire damage recovery or
whether the employer is to be permitted his credit would not inject considerations of fault into the adjudication of disability benefits.' 73 Therefore, granting the board jurisdiction to determine the negligence issue
would violate neither the spirit nor the letter of the constitutional
compensation system of "no fault."' 7 4 The court dismissed the
166. See notes 8-14 & accompanying text supra.
167. See note 10 & accompanying text supra.
168. 12 Cal. 3d at 890, 528 P.2d 775, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 687, quoting CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3517 (West 1970). See note 155 & accompanying text supra.
169. 57 Cal. 2d at 69, 366 P.2d at 647, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 375; see Nelsen v. WCAB,
11 Cal. App. 3d 472, 478-79, 89 Cal. Rptr. 638, 641 (1970). See notes 19-32 & accompanying text supra.
170. 12 Cal. 3d at 892, 528 P.2d at 777, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
171. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 21.
172. 12 Cal. 3d at 891, 528 P.2d at 776, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
173. Id. at 891, 528 P.2d at 777, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
174. Id.
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argument against jurisdiction based on the board's lack of expertise in this area on the ground that Labor Code sections 4551 and
455317'5 already require the board to decide the much more difficult
issue of fault in the case of serious or willful employer misconduct. 17
Finally, by way of dictum, the court indicated that the board and the
trial court should be bound to accept each other's prior adjudications
of employer negligence,
while each should be free to decide the issue
1 77
if it remains unsettled.
As discussed previously,' 7 8 the issue of board jurisdiction to determine employer negligence was debated skillfully in the majority and
dissenting opinions
in Corley. In Roe, also, the court treated this issue
79

effectively.'

The Dissenting Opinion in Roe
In a vigorous and cogent dissent in Roe, Justice Burke, with Justice Clark concurring, disagreed with the majority's application of Witt
to the credit situation. 8 0° Justice Burke attacked the majority's holding, claiming that it "results in an inequitable and wholly unjustified
double recovery by the employee . . . ."I" Furthermore, he suggested that the majority had confused the employer's right to a credit
with his right to reimbursement.'s2
The dissenting opinion maintained that to extend the Witt rule beyond the parameters of the reimbursement situation would upset the
83
relative equities of the parties as envisioned by Justice Traynor.1
175. See note 124 & accompanying text supra.
176. 12 Cal. 3d at 892, 528 P.2d at 777, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
177. Id.
178. See notes 110-24 & accompanying text supra.
179. Just before deciding Roe v. WCAB, the California Supreme Court denied a
hearing in a case in which the court of appeal had held that the employee cannot bring
the employer into the civil action or initiate adjudication of concurrent employer negligence in the trial court. See Gilford v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 41 Cal. App.
3d 828, 116 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1974). Contra, Levels v. Growers Ammonia Supply Co.,
48 Cal. App. 3d 443, 121 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1975).
180. 12 Cal. 3d at 894-98, 528 P.2d at 777-81, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 689-91 (Burke,
J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 892, 528 P.2d at 777, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
182. Id. at 893, 528 P.2d at 779-80, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 689-90.
183. The dissenting opinion stated: "Under the majority's holding the employee recovers both the full amount of the judgment against (or settlement with) the third party,
and the full disability award of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board without
any reduction whatever to eliminate duplicative payments. To the extent that the
amount of the judgment or settlement overlaps the employee's compensation award the
employee recovers double compensation for the same injury, a result expressly interdicted by this court in Witt." Id. at 894, 528 P.2d at 779, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 691 (Burke,
J.,
dissenting).
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Therefore, Justice Burke concluded that the employer should be allowed his statutory right to a credit, regardless of his negligence. 184 To
bar the negligent employer's right to a credit, the dissenting opinion
continued, unduly punishes him, as he has already been amply
penalized by the denial of his right to reimbursement. 185 Finally, Justhe board's jurisdiction
tice Burke questioned the constitutionality of
8 6
to determine the issue of employer negligence.1
In essence, the dissent in Roe is very similar in reasoning, and7
identical in result, to the appellate court holding in Corley v. WCAB,'1
a case discussed at some length earlier in this note.'88
Practical Problems Created by Roe
In an interpretation of any aspect of the workers' compensation
system, the interest of the employee should be considered primary.
The supreme court's decision in Roe, although ostensibly benefiting the
employee by allowing him a double recovery, will raise a number of
serious problems in practice.
Increase In Workers' Compensation Insurance Rates

The method for determining workers' compensation rates is
unique; it is based on an elaborate rate structure prepared and promulgated by the California Inspection Rating Bureau. 8 9 Acting as an arm
of the insurance commissioner, the bureau established a mandatory
minimum rate, which in practice is ordinarily the maximum rate, applicable to each particular industrial classification. 190
Under this system, subrogation recoveries are channeled into the
pool of funds available for the payment of losses.' 91 The manner in
which compensation rates are set by the insurance commissioner
through the Inspection Rating Bureau, while complicated as applied to
a given industrial classification, is simple in principle. 92 The total actual accident cost of the industry is accumulated and reported every
year. Rates are set each October by taking an amount equal to the
total estimated accident cost of the industry for the forthcoming year,
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
12 SANTA
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 898, 528 P.2d at 781, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
Id. at 894, 528 P.2d at 779, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
Id. at 898, 528 P.2d at 781, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
22 Cal. App. 3d 447, 99 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1971).
See notes 90-125 & accompanying text supra.
See Lasky, Subrogation Under the California Workmen's Compensation Laws,
CLARA LAw. 1, 5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Lasky].
Id.; see CAL. INS. CODE §§ 11732, 11736 (West 1971).
Lasky, supranote 189, at 5.
Id.
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based upon the experience of the preceding two years, and adding to
it a uniform administrative expense factor.19 3 Computation of the total
accident cost for the industry takes into account a subtraction for subrogation recoveries, which are required to be reported. Once the accident cost is determined, the amount of gross premium necessary to
yield an amount sufficient to cover accident losses and administrative
94
expense is set.1
The effect of the decision in Roe will be to reduce significantly
the number of subrogation recoveries, thus forcing a rise in premiums
throughout the system. At a time when there is considerable outcry
for an increase in workers' compensation benefits,' 9 5 the Roe decision
will prove the great silencer. An employee who is "graced" with the
fortuitous circumstance of being injured by the concurrent negligence
of his employer and a third party will receive an unprecedented double
recovery. The allowance of double recoveries, however, will be at the
expense of employees as a whole. Premiums must escalate' 96 in order
to subsidize the select employees' double recoveries. As a result, employee groups' demands for more substantial benefits will meet with
little sympathy, since such increases would push the premiums even
higher. Thus, the fortune enjoyed by the few will be to the detriment
of the many.
The Harmnful Effect on Labor Code Section 3856(b)
The court in Roe expressed the concern that under the Corley approach, a concurrently negligent employer could avoid the third party
lawsuit and then capitalize on the third party's damage payments by
means of a credit from the appeals board. 97 The court apparently
overlooked a number of prior cases which had addressed this specific
issue. In a series of four court of appeal decisions,' 98 it was held that
193. See id.; CALIFORNIA INSPECTION RATING BUREAU, MEMORANDUM, CALIFORNIA
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION MANUAL (1975).
194. Lasky, supra note 189, at 5; CALIFORNIA INSPECTION RATING BUREAU, CALIFORNIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATON UNrr STATISTICAL PLAN, 20-21 (1975).
195. See 3 CAL. WORKERs' COMP. RPR. 146 (1975).
196. The actual amount of this predicted increase in premiums can only be determined actuarily.
197. 12 Cal. 3d 890, 528 P.2d at 776, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
198. Brandon v. Santa Rita Technology, Inc., 25 Cal. App. 3d 838, 102 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1972); Serrano v. WCAB, 16 Cal. App. 3d 787, 94 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1971); Benwell
v. Dean, 249 Cal. App. 2d 354, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1967); Tate v. Superior Ct., 213
Cal. App. 2d 238, 28 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1963). But see City of Sacramento v. Superior
Ct., 205 Cal. App. 2d 398, 23 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1962) (employer can be made a necessary
and indispensable party upon filing of a cross-complaint by the third party only if the

third party initially makes a satisfactory showing that a justiciable issue of employer negligence can be raised).
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the issue of employer negligence could be raised and litigated by the
third party in the employee's suit even though the employer was not

a party to the action. Normally, concurrent employer negligence is asserted by the third party as an affirmative defense. 19 9 The justification 0 "
for allowing this assertion regardless of the employer's absence from

the suit stems from the court's holding in Witt that the employer's negligence bars his right to reimbursement "whether the action is brought
by the employer or employee." '0 1 It would be manifestly unfair to
predicate the third party's assertion of his Witt defense simply on
whether the employer seeks reimbursement by intervening in the em-

ployee's action or instead avoids the proceedings and asserts his lien
on the employee's recovery after trial. 20 , The rationale behind the
holding in Witt is that the employer is not a "necessary or indispensable
party" if his concurrent negligence is raised as a defense, because the

employee is in effect a trustee and can adequately protect the employer's interest. 20 8 This trustee notion is in turn based on the fact that

an employee has nothing to gain or lose by a finding of employer negli-

gence when a Witt defense is asserted.20 4 Moreover, the employer enjoys certain procedural safeguards. 20 5
Thus, under the authority of these appellate decisions prior to

Roe, an employer cannot avoid litigation of the issue of his concurrent
199. See City of Sacramento v. Superior Ct., 205 Cal. App. 2d 398, 23 Cal. Rptr.
43 (1962) (third party raised this issue by way of cross-complaint).
200. See Brandon v. Santa Rita Technology, Inc., 25 Cal. App. 2d 838, 843, 102
Cal. Rptr. 225, 227 (1972); Serrano v. WCAB, 16 Cal. App. 3d 787, 790, 94 Cal. Rptr.
511, 513 (1971); Benwell v. Dean, 249 Cal. App. 2d 345, 360-61, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394,
405-06 (1967); Tate v. Superior Ct., 213 Cal. App. 2d 238, 246, 28 Cal. Rptr. 548, 552
(1963).
201. 57 Cal. 2d at 72, 366 P.2d at 649, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
202. See Tate v. Superior Ct., 213 Cal. App. 2d 238, 246, 28 Cal. Rptr. 548, 552
(1963).
203. Brandon v. Santa Rita Technology, Inc., 25 Cal. App. 3d 838, 843, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 227 (1972); Serrano v. WCAB, 16 Cal. App. 3d 787, 790, 94 Cal. Rptr. 511,
513 (1971); Tate v. Superior Ct., 213 Cal. App. 2d 238, 246, 28 Cal. Rptr. 548, 552
(1963).
204. Brandon v. Santa Rita Technology, Inc., 25 Cal. App. 3d 838, 843, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 227 (1972); Tate v. Superior Ct., 213 Cal. App. 2d 238, 246, 28 Cal. Rptr.
548, 552 (1963). See Brown v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 427, 431-33, 476 P.2d 105, 10809, 90 Cal. Rptr. 737, 740-41 (1970).
205. A copy of the pleadings must be served on the employer, and he must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard if he chooses to intervene. Carden v. Otto,
37 Cal. App. 3d 887, 897, 112 Cal. Rptr. 749, 755 (1974); Brandon v. Santa Rita Technology, Inc., 25 Cal. App. 3d 838, 846, 102 Cal. Rptr. 225, 230 (1972). One case held
that the third party could bring the employer into the action by means- of cross-complaint, if and only if "there is a satisfactory showing that a justiciable issue can be xaised
that said employer has been concurrently and contributorily negligent." City of Sacramento v. Superior Ct., 205 Cal. App. 2d 398, 400, 23 Cal. Rptr. 43, 44-45 (1962).
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negligence by deciding not to intervene in the employee's third party
suit. If an employer so chooses, however, he need not enter into the
suit, as he is not a necessary or indispensable party to the action.2" 6
The court's holding in Roe destroys the rationale of these cases,
that should the employer decide not to join the third party suit, the employee can act as a trustee for the employer on the issue of his concurrent negligence. The employee, under Roe, will have a vested interest
in proving that the employer was concurrently negligent, since such a
showing will effect a double recovery.2 0 7 Although both the employer
and the employee are cast as party plaintiffs, realistically they will be
staunch adversaries.20 8 Since they will no longer share a trustee relationship, the employer will become a necessary and indispensable party
whenever the9 issue of concurrent employer negligence is raised by the
20
third party.
This result will have a far-reaching effect on the statutory system
established by the legislature. Before the decision in Roe, one of the
three reimbursement remedies available to the employer was provided
in section 3856(b) of the Labor Code, 10 which establishes the right
of the employer not to join the employee's suit. After Roe, this statutory provision will be effectively nullified, for the employer will be
forced to join the lawsuit once the issue of his negligence has been
raised by the third party.2 11 If such an issue is at all plausible, the
third party will raise the employer's negligence as a defense, as he has
nothing to lose and much to gain. Consequently, section 3856(b) will
206. One opinion held, however, that under certain special circumstances, the employer could be made a necessary party. See notes 199, 205 & accompanying text
supra.

207. Carden v. Otto, 37 Cal. App. 3d 887, 892-93, 112 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752 (1974).
See also Gilford v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 41 Cal. App. 3d 828, 833-34, 116
Cal. Rptr. 615, 618-19.
208.

See Lasky, supra note 189, at 24-25.

209.

See Tate v. Superior Ct., 213 Cal. App. 2d 238, 246, 28 Cal. Rptr. 548, 552

(1963). See notes 202-03 & accompanying text supra.
210. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3856(b) (West 1971).
211. See notes 198-209 & accompanying text supra. See Gilford v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 41 Cal. App. 3d 828, 116 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1974). The court in Gilford
held that the employee could not raise the issue of employer negligence in the trial court
action against the third party. In so holding, the Gilford court stressed the importance

of maintaining the statutory scheme which allows an employer to elect not to join the
third party suit.

The court stated:

"To hold that the employee has the right to raise

the issue of [the] employer's negligence in his suit against the third-party tortfeasor
would effectively destroy the employer's choice [not to join the law suit] which is ex-

plicitly provided for in the [Labor Code]." Id. at 834, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 619. See CAL.
LABOR CODE § 3856(b) (West 1971). But see Levels v. Growers Ammonia Supply Co.,
48 Cal. App. 3d 443, 121 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1975).

"
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become a meaningless provision.
tainly open to question.

The merits of such a result are cer-

212

Increased Gamesmanship
The California Constitution empowered the legislature to establish
a statutory system of workers' compensation "to the end that the administration of such legislation shall accomplish substantial justice in all
cases expeditiously, inexpensively and without encumbrance of any
character ....,,213 The holding in Roe, rather than encouraging employees to seek workers' compensation benefits "expeditiously," will
actually motivate them to delay seeking such benefits in an attempt to
maximize their double recoveries2 14 and will thus frustrate the legislature's intent.
For example, under Roe, if an employer is negligent, the employee is allowed to keep all workers' compensation benefits paid after
the third party suit, as well as the judgment against the third party. 1 5
Under these circumstances, it is decidedly in the employee's interest
to minimize the amount of workers' compensation benefits received before trial, since they are subject to the third party's Witt reduction, and
to maximize the benefits received after trial. Therefore, rather than
encouraging the employee to seek workers' compensation benefits
quickly, the Roe decision will prompt the employee to seek a larger
total recovery by delaying the pursuit of his full workers' compensation
award.
The third party, on the other hand, will make every effort to encourage the employee to secure pre-trial workers' compensation benefits and will attempt to delay the trial as long as possible. In this manner, the third party in a case involving a concurrently negligent employer will secure the largest possible Witt reduction of the judgment
against him.
Li v. Yellow Cab-Major Uncertainty in Present Law
Approximately four months after Roe, the California Supreme
212. A very serious yet unanswered question raised by the Roe decision is the effect on the employee of a finding of employer negligence (or lack of negligence) in a
subrogation suit between the employer and the third party. Will this finding be conclusive against the employee when he raises the question of employer negligence before the
board?
213. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 21.
214. Paul Peyrat, writing in the California Workmen's Compensation Reporter,
terms this situation "an unfortunate result." 2 CAL. WoRKmN's COMP. RPmR. 232
(1974).
215. Of course, the judgment against the third party would have been reduced by
the reimbursement amount (Witt reduction). See notes 127-31 & accompanying text
supra.
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Court decided the case of Li v. Yellow Cab Co.2 16 In Li, the court
abolished the rule of contributory negligence in California and replaced
it with a doctrine of "pure" comparative negligence.2 17 The court,
however, expressly chose not to resolve the issue of how comparative
negligence will affect contribution and indemnification rights among
joint tortfeasors,2 18 nor did it decide how comparative negligence
should operate in multiple party suits. 21 9 These express omissions by
the court in Li have introduced substantial uncertainty into a major area
of California workers' compensation law, as it is unclear whether or not
comparative negligence principles should be applied to the Witt and
Roe subrogation situations.
The Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, in the revision of
its Book of Approved Jury Instructions (BAJI), takes the unequivocal
position that comparative negligence does apply in the Witt situation.22
By contrast, members of the California Applicants' Attorneys Association contend that Li should apply neither to the employer's credit rights
before the WCAB nor to his reimbursement rights in the third party
suit.221

It is submitted that comparative negligence should be applied to
the subrogation area of workers' compensation. The opinion in Li appears to offer no basis for the conclusion that the court intended to exclude from the effect of its holding the broad area of subrogation rights
in the workers' compensation field. Indeed, the thrust of the decision,
which was to abolish the harsh "all-or-nothing" rule of contributory
negligence,2 22 is subverted if a negligent employer is denied all credit
and reimbursement remedies regardless of the extent of his negligence.
It has been argued that to allow the negligent employer a percentage recovery of the reimbursement and credit amounts, under comparative negligence principles, would destroy the rationale underlying
Witt and Roe, that an employer should not "profit from his own
wrong."2'23 This argument, however, is fallacious. The employer
216. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
Li was filed March 31, 1975.

The decision in

217.

Id. at 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.

218.
219.

Id. at 823, 826, 532 P.2d at 1239-40, 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72, 873.
Id.

220.

CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS,

CIVIL:

BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUC-

TIONS (BAJI), BAJI 15.16, -. 17 (P. Richards ed., 5th ed. 1969 & Sept. 15, 1975 rev.).
221. 3 CAL. WORKERS' COMP. RPTR. 120-21 (1975); Steinberg, Should Comparative
Negligence Apply to Witt v. Jackson, 3 L.A. TRIAL LAWYERS ASS'N ADVOCATE, July,
1975, at 1-2, 8. As of the date of the writing of this note, there has been no appellate
court or legislative response to this question.
222. 13 Cal. 3d at 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
223. Steinberg, Should Comparative Negligence Apply to Witt v. Jackson, 3 L.A.
TRIAL LAWYERS ASS'N ADVOCATE, July, 1975 at 2.
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would not "profit" by an application of comparative negligence concepts, for he would still be denied his reimbursement and credit rights
to the extent that he has caused the employee's injuries.
The entry of comparative negligence into the workers' compensation arena would in no way disturb the employee's absolute right to
2 24 Comrecover workers' compensation benefits irrespective of fault.
parative negligence would apply only to the situation in which the employer seeks reimbursement or credit based on his assertion that a third
party has, at least partially, caused an employee's injuries.
Merely concluding that comparative negligence should be applied
to the Witt and Roe subrogation situations does not answer the more
difficult question of how the doctrine should be applied.22 5 The court
in Li provided no guidelines whatever. One commentator has described a few of the many potential applications of comparative negligence to the reimbursement and credit situations. 226 It is beyond the
scope of this note to address this issue in depth within the context of
the present law. The legislature should formulate definite guidelines
to assist the courts and the WCAB.
The Need for Legislative Action
The opinion in Witt v. Jackson was an effort by the California Supreme Court to make certain that a concurrently negligent employer
would not be allowed to shift the entire financial burden of an employee's injury to a third party tortfeasor. Within the reimbursement context, the rationale and solution proposed in Witt work well. In the
credit situation, however, the California courts have been faced with
a problem for which there has been no satisfactory solution. Substantial difficulties inhere in the claims of all three parties who seek the
credit amount. The third party's claim is replete with jurisdictional and
administrative infirmities. 227 On the other hand, the decision in Corley
demonstrates that permitting the employer to claim the amount renders
the substantive rights of the parties subject to the vagaries of calendaring.228 Finally, consideration of the circumstances in Roe reveals that
recognizing the employee's claim to the credit amount creates practical
problems
and leads to the ill-advised result of allowing a double recov229
ery.
224. CAL.

CONST.

art. XX, § 21.

225. Peyrat, Comparative Negligence in Third Party Cases, 3 CAL. WonKERS'
CoMP. RPR. 99-102 (1975).
226. Id.
227. See notes 41-58 & accompanying text supra.
228. See note 125 & accompanying text supra.
229. See notes 189-215 & accompanying text supra. Future cases interpreting Roe
may well narrowly define the boundaries of Roe's allowance of double recovery. In one
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The problem with which the courts struggle in this area is the
overlap and conflict between the fault concept fundamental to tort law
and the no-fault basis of workers' compensation law. Until the decisions in Roe and Nelsen, an employee's rights against his employer
were based solely on workers' compensation law, in which the issue
of negligence was irrelevant. In contrast, the claims of both the employee and the employer against the third party, as well as the claim
of the third party against the employer, have always been based entirely
on allegations of negligence. The situation is further complicated by
the fact that technically the employer and third party are not "joint tortfeasors;" the employer and the third party lack the requisite mutual liability in tort23 0 because of the employer's exclusive liability to the employee under workers' compensation law.2 31 Both the majority and the
appellate decision interpreting Roe, the court was faced with a case in which an employee had suffered a work related injury allegedly caused by his employer and a third
party. In the employee's suit against the third party, the employer had been found concurrently negligent. The third party's liability to the injured employee-plaintiff had been
founded not on ordinary negligence, but on former subdivision (a)(3) of section 3601
of the Labor Code ("a reckless disregard for the safety" of the plaintiff "and a calculated
and conscious willingness to permit injury or death" to him). Fuller v. Capital Sky
Park, 46 Cal. App. 3d 727, 729-31, 120 Cal. Rptr. 131, 132-33 (1975).
The employee argued that he should be allowed a double recovery because under
these circumstances, the third party should not be allowed his Witt reduction. The employee cited Roe in support of his claim for double recovery. The Third District in
Fuller rejected the employee's claim. The Fuller court stressed once again the importance of not allowing a plaintiff-employee a double recovery and therefore narrowly
limited Roe to its facts. The court maintained that the fact that the third party had
not asserted his Witt defense in the trial court had been the sine qua non of the Roe
court's departure from the normal rule of not allowing double recovery. Id. at 731-34,
120 Cal. Rptr. at 133-35.
The Fuller court's interpretation of Roe is faulty. Under Roe, regardless of
whether the third party raises his Witt defense in the trial court, the employee would
secure a double recovery by proving employer negligence before the board. Despite the
Fuller court's faulty analysis of Roe, however, the court clearly evidenced its intent
strictly to limit Roe and to reaffirm the "sound legal theory" of not allowing double
recovery to the injured employee. Id. at 731-34, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 133-36.
Another appellate decision relying on the erroneous reasoning in Roe that it is
the third party rather than the employer who is hurt by the employee's double recovery
concluded that the employee can raise the issue of employer negligence in the trial action. This holding was directly opposite to the decision reached in an earlier appellate
decision, Gilford v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 41 Cal. App. 3d 828, 116 Cal. Rptr.
615 (1974), yet the court did not even mention the Gilford opinion. See Levels v.
Growers Ammonia Supply Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 443, 121 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1975). See
also notes 137-147 & accompanying text supra.
The final appellate decision interpreting Roe held that the employee could appeal
the trial court's determination that the employer had not been negligent. See Short v.
State Compensation Ins. Fund, 52 Cal. App. 3d 104, 125 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1975).
230. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3600, 3864 (West 1971); 2 A. LARSEN, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAw 76.21 (1975); Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 977, 980-82 (1957).
231. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3601 (West 1971).
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dissent in Roe v. WCAB indicate that legislative action is needed to
remedy this perplexing situation.232 Moreover, in view of the uncertainty raised by the opinion in Li as to the applicability of comparative

negligence principles to subrogation situations such as those in Witt and
Roe,2 3 the need for legislative action is imperative.
A Possible Alternative
Any proposed solution to this triangular problem must consider
carefully the respective equities of the three participants involved: the
employee, the employer, and the third party. After reviewing the alternatives proposed by other commentators 2 4 and evaluating the paths

followed by other states, 38 this author believes that the most advantageous solution would be a "modified comparative negligence' scheme.
As under present law,2 3 6 the employee under this modified comparative negligence scheme would be allowed to seek workers' com-

pensation benefits as well as to bring an action against the third party
tortfeasor.

Contrary to current law, however, the employee would be

required to seek his full workers' compensation award before bringing
232. 12 Cal. 3d at 892, 898, 528 P.2d at 777, 781, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 689, 693.
233. See notes 216-226 & accompanying text supra.
234. E.g., Note, Workmen's Compensation and Third Party Suits: The Aftermath
of Witt v. Jackson, 21 IAsTINGS L.J. 661, 677-82 (1970); Note, Recovery from a Third
Party Under California Workmen's Compensation: Guidelines for Legislative Change,
18 HASTINGs L.J 710, 719-20 (1967).
235. In Florida, within one year of the injury, the employee alone has the right
to bring suit against the third party. The employer can file a lien in the action for
the amount of workers' compensation benefits "paid or to be paid." The employer is
allowed to recover automatically 50% of the lien amount, regardless of his negligence.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.39 (West 1966 & Supp. 1975). If this one year period lapses,
the employer can bring the suit against the third party on behalf of the employee. If
successful, the employer recovers all amounts paid or payable to the employee, regardless
of employer negligence. Id.; see Pyles v. Bridges, 283 So. 2d 394 (Fla. App. 1973).
In New York, indemnification is allowed between a concurrently negligent employer and
a third party tortfeasor. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288,
331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972); North Carolina allows a third party tortfeasor to reduce his
judgment by the workers' compensation benefits "paid or to be paid" in the case of a
concurrently negligent employer. The negligence of the employer, however, must be independent, and not based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Lovette v. Lloyd, 236
N.C. 663, 73 S.E.2d 886 (1953); Brown v. Southern Ry. Co., 204 N.C. 668, 169 S.E.
419 (1933). Pennsylvania allows limited contribution (to the extent of his workers'
compensation liability) by a concurrently negligent employer to a third party tortfeasor
on a policy of joint negligence rather than one of joint liability. Elston v. Indus. Lift
Truck Co., 420 Pa. 97, 102, 216 A.2d 318, 320 (1966); J.W. Brown, Jr. Equip. Rental
Corp. v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 461-62, 155 A.2d 836, 840 (1959). See also Note, Recovery from a Third Party Under California Workmen's Compensation: Guidelines for
Legislative Change, 18 HASTINGS LJ.710, 716-19 (1967).
236. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3852 (West 1971).
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suit against the third party.2 7 The purpose for such a requirement
is two-fold; first, pursuant to the California Constitution,23 8 to encourage the "expeditious" determination of workers' compensation
benefits; and second, to determine fully the extent of employer liability
for workers' compensation benefits before the third party suit.
In the court action between the employee and the third party, the
proposed solution would allow the employer to file a lien on the judgment for the amount of workers' compensation benefits paid and to be
paid. All three parties, the employer, the employee, and the third
party, would be made necessary and indispensable parties to the action.
The court (or jury), after presentation of the evidence, would determine under the comparative negligence principles adopted in Li the
respective percentage liabilities of the three parties.
As under current law, the jury would award the employee damages which, pursuant to Li, would have been reduced by the employee's percentage of comparative negligence.23 9 The court would then
reduce the employer's lien by the dollar amount corresponding to the
percentage of the initial damages for which the employer had been adjudged liable. The amount of the employer's lien would thus constitute
the maximum amount of his liability to the employee. The third party
would then pay either the difference between the recovered damages
and the amount of the lien or the difference between the recovered
damages and the employer's percentage share of the initial damages,
whichever is greater. In essence, the third party would be allowed to
deduct from the judgment against him the amount by which the employer's lien had been reduced as a result of the employer's concurrent
negligence.
A discussion of two hypothetical situations may prove helpful in
illustrating this proposed solution. Assume the following facts: (1)
The employee's total workers' compensation award was $1000, and the
237. See note 6 & accompanying text supra. The potential statute of limitations
problem involved here can be handled in one of two ways: (1) by tolling the statute
of limitations on the employee's third party action while the employee seeks his workers'
compensation award or (2) by allowing the employee to file the action against the third
party, so that the employee may conduct discovery, and permitting a motion to delay

the trial until after the workers' compensation award is received.
238. See note 112 supra.
239. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975). For the purposes of this discussion, the terms "judgment"
and "verdict" will be used interchangeably. The term "initial damages" refers to the

sum which corresponds to the amount of injury which the jury determines the plaintiff
has suffered. The term "recovered damages" refers to the amount of damages the plaintiff is entitled to recover under comparative negligence principles. Thus, recovered damages are equal to the initial damages reduced by the plaintiff's (employee's) percentage

share of negligence in causing his injury. The term "recovered damages" describes a
sum equal to the amount of the plaintiff's (employee's) judgment.
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employer filed a lien in the third party action for that amount. (2) The
jury found the employee to be 20% negligent, the third party to be
60% negligent, and the employer to be 20% negligent. (3) The jury
found the initial damages to be $10,000 and, after reducing this amount
by 20% (the employee's percentage of negligence) awarded the employee recovered damages of $8,000.
The employer would theoretically be liable for 20% of the initial
damages (20% of $10,000), or $2,000. Since he is not a joint tortfeasor, however, the extent of his liability is limited to the amount of his
lien, $1,000. The third party then pays either the difference between
the recovered damages and the amount of the lien, or the difference
between the recovered damages and the employer's percentage share
of the initial damages, whichever is greater. Here, the employer's lien
is less than the employer's percentage share of the initial damages
($1,000 as compared to $2,000). Therefore, the third party pays the
difference between the recovered damages ($8,000) and the lien
amount ($1,000), or $7,000 total. The employee in this case recovers
$8,000, since he is entitled to the workers' compensation award
($1,000) or the tort judgment ($8,000), whichever is greater. Of this
amount, $7,000 has been paid by the third party, and $1,000 has been
paid by the employer. The employer's lien fights were nullified by
his degree of negligence.
The second hypothetical situation is the same as the first, except
that one fact is altered: the employer's negligence, instead of 20%,
was found to be 5%; thus, the third party was found to be 75% negligent. Under these facts, the employer's percentage share of the initial
damages is $500 (5% of $10,000). Therefore, the employer's lien of
$1,000, rather than being nullified, is merely reduced by $500, allowing him a subrogation recovery of $500 ($1,000 minus $500). The
third party pays the remainder of the employee's recovered damages
above the percentage share, since the percentage share is now less than
the employer's lien amount. The third party's share is thus $8,000
minus $500, or $7,500. As in the first hypothetical situation, the employee retains the tort recovery ($8,000), since it is again larger than
his workers' compensation award ($1,000). The employer has recovered $500 of his lien, and the third party has paid the difference between the $8,000 and the $500, or $7,500.
The apparent inequity in this scheme of forcing the third party
potentially to pay far beyond his actual percentage degree of participation in causing the injury is due to the fact that under workers' compensation law, the employer is not a joint tortfeasor. Therefore, the employer's liability is never more than the dollar amount of his workers'
compensation liability. Actually, the third party is placed in a much
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better position under this solution than under present law, which limits
the employer's "contribution" to the reimbursement amount.
This modified comparative negligence scheme has many beneficial qualities. Most important, the proposed solution fully provides for
the injured employee by allowing him to recover either the compensation award or the amount of the judgment against the third party,
whichever is greater. On the other hand, the employee is not allowed
a double recovery. 4 '
This solution, by enabling the employer to file a lien for amounts
paid or to be paid, eliminates the distinction between reimbursement
and credit. This distinction, although necessary to an understanding
of current California law, 241 is an artificial device which determines the
rights of the parties on the basis of arbitrary time factors.24 2 Under
the proposed solution, the rights and obligations of the employer and
the third party are determined on the basis of their respective degrees
of fault in causing the injury. Nevertheless, in keeping with current
law, the employer is not a joint tortfeasor, as his liability to the employee is derived exclusively from workers' compensation law rather
than from tort law. Consequently, the employer can never be required
to pay more than the maximum amount of his workers' compensation
liability. The proposed solution thus preserves the present limitation
on the employer's liability. Furthermore, wording this solution in
terms of "lien rights" eliminates the purely theoretical inconsistency involved in requiring "contribution" from the employer, who under workers' compensation law is not a joint tortfeasor.2 43
This proposed solution would allow the employee to secure his
workers' compensation benefits quickly, with the minimum of legal
hurdles. The issue of negligence would not have to be determined by
the WCAB, as the issue would always be decided by the forum most
suited for such a determination-the courts.24 4
240. It might be argued that in a situation like that in the hypotheticals, there is
no double recovery, even if the employee recovers both his tort judgment (recovered
damages) and his workers' compensation award, since the total of the two is less than
the employee's initial damages. However, this argument fails to recognize that under
comparative negligence principles, the plaintiff (employee) is entitled only to his recovered damages, an amount equal to the initial damages reduced by his percentage share

of fault in causing his injury. Therefore, to allow the employee both his recovered damages and his workers' compensation award is properly deemed a double recovery. Moreover, under the contributoy negligence scheme, the plaintiff in the hypothetical situa-

tions would have been denied any recovery.
241.
242.

See notes 8-18, 33 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 125, 212-215 & accompanying text supra.

243.

See note 71 & accompanying text supra. See also Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d

57, 71, 366 P.2d 641, 647-48, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375-76 (1961).
244. See Roe v. WCAB, 12 Cal. 3d 884, 892, 528 P.2d 771, 777, 117 Cal. Rptr.
683, 689 (1974).
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Under the proposed solution, the employer would not be able "to
profit from his own wrong," for his subrogation recovery would be
diminished by the degree of his participation in causing the injury.
Contrary to current law,2 4 5 however, he would not be denied all subrogation rights if he were found to have been only slightly negligent.
The third party would also be treated fairly under this scheme. At
worst, if the employer were found not to have been negligent, the third
party would be able to deduct nothing; his condition would be no worse
than it is presently. At best he would be allowed a deduction for all
workers' compensation benefits paid or to be paid, which would be a
much broader remedy than that currently available.
Finally, this proposal would eliminate the gamesmanship which
the current law so clearly engenders.1 46 The workers' compensation
system could once again "accomplish substantial justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and without encumbrance of any character
"247
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